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Abstract
State and local governments occasionally receive positive exogenous payments or
windfalls that have a significant impact on their budgets. However, few works examine how
budget-makers allocate such payments or if they are consumed in a manner consistent with other
revenue streams. Prior research suggests that multiple factors, including the size of a windfall
payment, impact how much of the funds are saved and spent. Using data from the Act 13
Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee in Pennsylvania, this study examines the relationship
between windfall payment size and savings rates between 2011 and 2019. The results of the
study indicate that windfall size is a significant indicator of savings rates and that a curvilinear
relationship between payment size and savings rates exists.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
State and local governments benefit tremendously from intergovernmental transfers, legal
settlements, and other payments that inject cash into their budgets. These positive, exogenous
shocks, or windfalls, may lead public officials to create rainy day funds, increase spending,
decrease taxes, or establish new programs and initiatives that otherwise would not exist (Berset
& Schelker, 2020; Drescher et al., 2020; Heyndels & Van Driessche, 2002). Despite the
importance of these payments for state and local governments, few studies examine how public
officials consume them or if public budgeting norms apply to their allocation (Paler, 2013).
While public officials may spend and save windfalls the same as other standard revenue streams
like taxes and fees, a growing body of research suggests that the special nature of the payments
(i.e., the fact that the funds are from outside the jurisdiction or are unanticipated) may influence
the budgeting process (Heyndels & Van Driessche, 2002; Karger & Rajan, 2020; Paler, 2013;
Rucker, 1984).
Traditional approaches to public budgeting suggest that the actors involved in budgetmaking and the context in which the budgeting process occurs help explain how governments
allocate funds. Like any other funding source, one would examine lobbyists, interest groups,
political parties, and current economic conditions to understand how windfall payments are
consumed. However, current research suggests that the traditional budgeting literature and its
emphasis on the politics of budgeting may not be as relevant in explaining windfall payment
decision-making as other research streams, which lean heavily on insights from behavioral
economics.
The literature outside of the politics of budgeting stream suggests that public officials
may be inclined to spend a windfall payment differently than the revenue raised from within the
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jurisdiction (e.g., taxes, fees, and fines) (Hines & Thaler, 1995; Mehiriz & Marceau, 2014).
According to scholars in behavioral economics, public officials may perceive windfalls
differently from endogenous revenue sources and consequently ignore traditional budgeting
norms (Da et al., 2015; McKay, 2000). Research suggests, for example, that a windfall payment
may be perceived as a bonus or type of mad money item that can be spent more freely than
endogenous tax revenue (Becker et al., 2020). Such perceptions may be significantly influenced
by the size of the windfall payment relative to the overall budget. Studies evaluating windfall
size indicate that individuals are more likely to spend than save small windfalls. However, few
works examine that phenomenon in the public arena (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983; Heyndels & Van
Driessche, 1998, 2002; James P. Keeler et al., 1985; Rucker, 1984).
This study explored the relationship between windfall size and savings rates in the local
government setting. Using data from the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee in
Pennsylvania distributed to municipalities, the study compared the size of the payment from Act
13 relative to municipal budgets from 2011 to 2019 to understand if municipalities saved
payments that were larger and spent payments that were smaller. The findings of the study help
inform the work of scholars and practitioners alike who wish to better understand windfall
payment decision-making in the public arena.
This chapter will provide context to the study, present the problem statement, identify the
research question and hypotheses, explain how the study advances the field of public budgeting,
and examine the limitations of the study. The later chapters will review the current literature on
public budgeting and windfall payments, the methods employed, and the findings of the study.
The conclusion will explain the significance of the study and its applications for scholars and
practitioners.
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Background of the Study
State and local governments come into found money on occasion. That is, they receive
payments that occur with irregularity or are outside of normal revenue streams. Such payments
come about because of grants, fees, charges, intergovernmental transfers, or even lawsuits and
legal settlements. Examples of recent windfalls to public organizations in the United States
include the COVID-19 relief funds distributed to state and local governments and monies
distributed to the states as a part of the Volkswagen emissions scandal settlement. These
windfalls, and the many others that exist, represent a positive exogenous shock to public coffers
and, as such, may offer a budgetary opportunity for public officials that did not previously exist
(Berset & Schelker, 2020; Nikolova & Marinov, 2017; Speight & MacDonald, 1989; Sylvain
Leduc & Daniel Wilson, 2017).
Given the impact windfalls can have on state and local governments (in some cases,
windfalls may exceed normal revenue streams, especially at the local government level), citizens
and public officials should understand how budget-makers allocate the funds. While many
windfall payments made to public organizations have rules or regulations that stipulate how the
funds are to be expended, exceptions to the rules and situations in which those rules are ignored
exist (Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998; Mehiriz & Marceau, 2014; Paler, 2013; Sloan et al.,
2005; Stotsky, 1991). In cases where the restrictions placed on funds are ambiguous or ignored,
windfalls may be tantamount to lottery winnings or bonuses for budget-makers.
Furthermore, few works examine how state and local public officials spend and save
windfall payments. While there is a robust body of literature on public budgeting broadly, there
is a dearth of information regarding windfall payments specifically. Much of the literature on
public budgeting suggests that budget-makers are revenue agnostic and treat windfalls as any
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other payment (Caiden, 1985; Kelly & Wanna, 2000; Levine et al., 1981). But a competing body
of literature contends that windfall payment decision-making is more complex and relies on
mental accounting methods and other behavioral phenomena to explain consumption patterns
(Becker et al., 2020; Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998; Thaler, 1999).
Problem Statement
Prior to the study, few works examined how collective decision-making bodies, like state
and local governments, consume windfall payments. While many studies evaluated how private
individuals consume windfalls, few applied those concepts to public organizations (Clark, 2002;
Drescher et al., 2020; Epley & Gneezy, 2007; Kreinin, 1961; Reid, 1962). This study addressed
the gap in the literature by examining payments from the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas
Impact Fee in Pennsylvania municipalities. Specifically, the study examined whether the size of
the payments distributed under Act 13 impacted how much of the windfall public officials spent
and saved.
The importance of windfalls, and later windfall size, emerged in the research of Friedman
(1957), Bodkin (1959), Doenges (1966), Landsberger (1966), Abdel-Ghany et al. (1983), Rucker
(1984), and Keeler et al. (1985). Rucker (1984) found that the size of a windfall was the most
critical discriminator in savings and consumption. Abdel-Ghany et al. (1983) and Keeler et al.
(1985) found that small windfalls received by individuals tended to be spent, whereas large
windfalls tended to be saved. Such findings directly contradicted earlier works concerning
windfalls and the permanent income hypothesis (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983; James P. Keeler et
al., 1985).
Research from behavioral economics supports the work of Abdel-Ghany et al. (1983),
Rucker (1984), and Keeler et al. (1985) by suggesting that mental and emotional processes may
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lead decision-makers to perceive small windfalls as meaningful shocks to their wealth and spend
the funds more freely (Milkman & Beshears, 2009). These mental and emotional processes
identified by the researchers, collectively referred to as mental accounting methods, influence
how individuals save and spend funds every day. A growing body of work tests the existence of
these methods and suggests that budgeting is more complex than previously thought (Thaler,
1999, 2008; Yuntong Gou et al., 2013).
Despite the significance of these findings, few studies explore whether such patterns
apply in public settings. While previous research studies provide evidence for how individuals
consume windfall payments, most do not attempt to understand if collective decision-making
bodies, like local or state governments, consume them in the same way. In one case where
mental accounting and windfall payments were examined in the public setting, researchers found
that public officials were influenced by mental accounting methods when controlling the public
purse (Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998). This study sought to build off that work and others by
examining the importance of windfall size in the public arena.
Understanding how and why state and local governments allocate windfall payments the
way they do is important to scholars and practitioners for two reasons. First, windfall payments
often have an intended purpose (and ideal consequences) established by the granting body. The
grantors distributing the payments want the guidelines for usage to be followed. Should those
guidelines be ignored, or the funds spent in a way different from what is intended, then the
grantors might consider new guidelines or consequences for misuse in the future. If, for example,
payments are disbursed to a local government to defray the costs associated with a natural
disaster and the funds are instead allocated to tax decreases or raises for public officials, then the
entire purpose of the funds would be undermined, and the grantor may seek redress. Given the
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potential impact these funds have on finance and policy, understanding how officials treat them
is warranted.
Second, windfalls may present a significant opportunity to change the status quo for a
state or local government. If public officials perceive windfall payments as a type of mad money
budgeting item, they may not be as strategic in their use of the funds. In some cases, the special
monies may even lead to corruption or misuse (Nikolova & Marinov, 2017). Understanding key
predictors in the consumption of windfalls thus becomes an important public policy and
management question.
As special payments to state and local governments are made now, and in the future,
policymakers should understand if the funds are treated differently than endogenous revenue.
And if the payments are treated differently, policymakers should understand how and why.
Special payments may be misused or lead to suboptimal policy outcomes without this
understanding. For these reasons, windfall payments require further examination in the literature.
Research Question and Hypothesis
This quantitative research study examined the relationship between windfall payment
size and savings at the local government level. The predictor variable was the size of the windfall
payment received by municipalities, and the criterion variable was the savings rate.
Operationally, saving referred to an allocation to capital reserves made by municipalities
receiving the payment. This approach assisted in answering the following research question and
hypotheses:
RQ: To what extent does the relative size of a windfall payment impact savings rates?
H0: The relative size of the Act 13 payment will have no impact on savings rates.
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H1: The relative size of the Act 13 payment will have a statistically significant impact on
savings rates.
H2: Municipalities that receive relatively small payments will be more likely to spend
the windfall than municipalities that receive relatively large payments.
Advancing Knowledge and Practical Applications
This research study advances the scientific knowledge by expanding upon the work of the
economists evaluating windfall payments and the behavioral economists exploring the theories
of fungibility, mental accounting, labeling, anticipation of payments, and emotional attachments
to funds (Abeler & Marklein, 2017; Arkes et al., 1994; Thaler, 1999). Specifically, the work
tested findings from the work of Abdel-Ghany et al. (1983), Rucker (1984), and Keeler et al
(1985) to the public sector. Through quantitative analysis, the relationship between windfall
payment size and consumption patterns became clear.
Given the importance of windfall payments to public decision-makers in contemporary
America (at the time of this publication, payments from COVID-19 to state and local
governments were receiving much attention), more research should be conducted to identify how
public officials behave when faced with a payment outside of typical revenue streams. If public
officials treat windfall payments differently than typical revenue streams (e.g., taxes and fees) by
spending them freely, for example, then new rules and regulations guiding how the payments are
used may be warranted. Identifying these consumption patterns will help guide scholars and
practitioners alike in the future.
Rationale for the Methodology
This study employed quantitative techniques to examine the relationship between
windfall payment size and savings patterns of windfall payments in the public setting.
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Specifically, the study utilized a fixed-effects panel regression, and later a quadratic regression,
to evaluate the relationship between windfalls and savings rates. Similar methods have been used
extensively in the literature. Researchers have adopted fixed-effects models and panel data in the
windfall payment stream for private individuals and public organizations, as well as the body of
work concerning behavioral economics (Anessi-Pessina & Sicilia, 2015; Christiaensen & Pan,
2010; Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998, 2002; Marques & Pires, 2019; Snoddon, 2004).
Limitations and Delimitations
Two significant limitations outside of the control of the researcher exist for the study. These
limitations included the following:
1. Data made available by the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and the
Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED) are self-reported by the
municipalities. Therefore, the accuracy of the data is subject to the municipalities' skills,
abilities, and desires to present information accurately. Changes to budgets versus what
was reported to the agencies were probable. Therefore, slight differences were likely to
exist for at least some municipalities.
2. Within the data set, missing values existed. For some locales in different years, data was
not made available. While missing values were sparse, they inevitably impacted the
model.
In addition, two significant delimitations exist. The delimitations included:
1. The study focused exclusively on Pennsylvania and its municipalities. Certainly, many
other states and municipalities receive windfall payments that differ significantly in size
and structure from those disbursed through the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas
Impact Fee.
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2. The researcher employed quantitative techniques only. No surveys, interviews, or other
qualitative methods were included in the study's design.
While neither the limitations nor delimitations were unusual for this type of study, they
inevitably impacted the study and its generalizability.
Summary
Despite the importance of windfall payments for the public purse, a gap in the literature
concerning how public entities save and consume windfalls exists. This quantitative research
study addressed that gap by exploring the relationship between windfall payment size and
savings in Pennsylvania municipalities between 2011 and 2019. Specifically, the research
examined savings rates for municipalities that received payments from the Act 13
Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee. The study built on existing literature on windfall
payments, consumption, and behavioral economics and explored whether windfall size impacts
savings rates.
In the following chapters, the researcher reviews the extant literature and conducts the
quantitative analysis. Chapter 2 presents a review of the pertinent literature and the theoretical
foundations of the study. Chapter 3 reviews the methods employed by the researcher to examine
the relationship between payment size and consumption. Chapter 4 presents the results and
chapter 5 explores implications of the study and provides direction for future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Positive, exogenous shocks or windfalls present a unique opportunity for budget-makers.
The newfound monies from a windfall payment may be saved to establish rainy day funds, fill
budget holes, reduce taxes, or fund new programs or initiatives. To understand how public
officials allocate the funds from a windfall, one might review the vast body of literature on
public budgeting. Over the past several decades, researchers have examined various aspects of
public budgeting and developed positive and normative frameworks for understanding budget
regimes in the United States and abroad (Caiden, 1985; Levine et al., 1981; Wildavsky, 1988).
Despite such a large body of work, research specifically focused on windfall payments in
the public sector is scarce (Paler, 2013). The extant literature addresses some cases where states
and municipalities receive windfall payments, but the work is limited. Furthermore, few studies
examine any windfall-specific frameworks for understanding the budgeting implications of such
payments (Aragon & Casale, 2017; Heyndels & Van Driessche, 2002; Niemeyer et al., 2004;
Sloan et al., 2005).
Considering this scarcity, reviewing the body of work focused on individuals and
windfall payments proves helpful. Unlike the traditional literature on the politics of budgeting,
emerging research suggests that the perception of these payments as budgetary windfalls may
influence how policymakers treat them (Basili et al., 2008; Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998;
Mehiriz & Marceau, 2014). Public officials may be inclined to spend or save the funds in a
manner that is different from endogenous taxes or fees, for example, because the funds may
present an opportunity to depart from typical budgeting processes (Heyndels & Van Driessche,
1998). The literature from behavioral economics contends that this is so because budgetary
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decision-makers may be highly influenced by mental accounting methods when dealing with
such payments and treat the funds as a bonus or gift (Levav & Mcgraw, 2009; Thaler, 2008).
Such explanations are a radical departure from the standard budgeting literature, which
emphasizes the role of politics in the budgeting process. A myriad of studies spanning multiple
decades finds that lobbyists, interest groups, and public officials, as well as economic and
political circumstances, significantly influence budget decision-making (Ahrens & Ferry, 2018;
Caiden, 1985; David D. Laitin & Aaron Wildavsky, 1988; Kelly & Wanna, 2000; Naomi Caiden,
2010; Wildavsky, 1975, 1988). However, these studies do not generally address windfall
payments (Paler, 2013). And while the field of behavioral economics offers valuable insights like
those mentioned, most of the conclusions from that field apply to individual decision-makers and
have not yet been applied or tested in public settings where collective decision-making occurs
(Heyndels & Van Driessche, 2002).
Given the importance of windfall payments to public decision-makers in contemporary
America (states have received vast sums of money from legal settlements, for example), more
research should be conducted to identify how public officials behave when faced with a payment
outside of standard revenue streams (e.g., taxes and fees). If public officials treat windfall
payments differently than standard revenue streams by spending them freely, for example, new
rules and regulations guiding how they are used may be warranted.
This chapter will define the term windfalls, examine traditional approaches to public
budgeting, discuss windfall payment consumption, and examine observations from behavioral
economics concerning windfall payments. Finally, the section will discuss Act 13 in
Pennsylvania. The discussion regarding Act 13 will exhibit how and why the Unconventional
Natural Gas Impact Fee established in the Commonwealth serves as an excellent illustration of
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windfall payment decision-making and how it can be used to better understand the importance of
the relative size of a windfall payment in budgeting processes.
Defining Windfalls
Numerous definitions of the term windfall exist in the economics and public finance
literature. Some of the earliest definitions were proposed in the 1950s and 1960s by scholars
examining the consumption of post-war payments made by the US government to soldiers of
World War II. Researchers were interested in identifying if the soldiers spent the post-war
payments differently than earned income. In those studies, the researchers found varying
consumption levels, with some scholars finding the marginal propensity to consume the windfall
at or below .3 while others found it to be as high as .72 (Bodkin, 1959; Friedman, 2018; Reid,
1962).
The early studies on windfall payments defined windfalls as substantial monetary
transfers that were unanticipated and transitory in nature (Buddelmeyer & Peyton, 2014;
Friedman, 1957). Friedman’s rather broad definition was clarified by Reid (1962), who claimed
that windfalls are “inheritances and occasional large gifts of money from persons outside the
family… and net receipts from the settlement of fire and accident policies” (Reid, 1962). Other
scholars built off of the work of Friedman (1958) and Reid (1962) and argued that payments
from life insurance benefits, gambling winnings, cash gifts, and cash legacies should also be
considered windfalls worthy of study (Bodkin, 1959; Kreinin, 1961; Reid, 1962). Despite the
slight differences, in nearly all cases, scholars emphasized the unexpected and temporary nature
of the payments or receipts as crucial characteristics of windfall payments to individuals.
More recently, scholars, especially those in behavioral economics, consider any payment
outside of normal circumstances to be a windfall, regardless of size or expectation. Small and

12

large payments as well as some repeated payments outside of ordinary income, are all considered
windfalls (Basili et al., 2008; Clark, 2002; Milkman & Beshears, 2009). The scholars engaged in
this research contend that small gifts, cash bonuses, and even coupons or rebates are windfall
payments. According to the research, the abnormality of the payment or departure from the status
quo is the defining feature of a windfall payment, regardless of size and repetition (Buddelmeyer
& Peyton, 2014; Epley et al., 2006; Epley & Gneezy, 2007).
In the public finance arena, definitions of windfalls vary more widely. For example,
Heyndels and Van Driesshe (2002) contend that windfalls are merely exogenous budgetary
shocks that can come about through various circumstances, including grants and economic,
legislative, and administrative taxes. In other words, windfalls are merely outside, found money
passed along to governing bodies. Paler (2013) qualifies the definition by arguing that a windfall
in the public arena “generates [economic] rents or incomes that can be substantial in scale, is
paid by external actors, and accrues directly to governments without necessitating bureaucratic
capacity or interaction with citizens” (Paler, 2013). The former definition focuses on the
exogenous source of the funds while the latter emphasizes the nature of the payment and its
implications for the recipient, with a particular emphasis on institutions for dealing with such
payments. Like the definitions provided by the behavioral economists, both definitions still
emphasize the departure from the status quo as the critical hallmark of a budgetary windfall.
For the purposes of this study, the term windfall will apply the broader conceptualization
provided in the literature. In other words, the study will consider any payment to a governmental
body that falls outside the status quo to be a windfall. Thus, positive exogenous shocks, like legal
settlements, stimulus payments, and fees/fines, will all be considered windfalls that merit
examination in the public arena. When presented with a windfall, understanding how

13

governments behave is important as positive exogenous budgetary shocks create opportunities
that may not exist with typical or traditional revenue streams.
The Importance of Understanding Windfall Spending in the Public Arena
Numerous high-profile windfalls have been dispersed to state and local governments. In
the 1990s, states received large sums from the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. Many
years later, states received payments from Volkswagen as a part of the settlement for the
company’s emissions cheating scandal. And at the time of this publication, states and
municipalities received payments from the federal government in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Identifying these budgetary shocks as windfalls and understanding how governments
treat them is critical to advancing the public budgeting literature. If these payments are somehow
treated differently by public officials, much in the same way individuals tend to treat personal
windfalls differently from income (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983; Bodkin, 1959; Milkman &
Beshears, 2009), then more research should be completed to understand how and why these
differences exist. This section will briefly discuss each windfall, its importance for public
budgeting, and why additional work is necessary.
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. On November 23, 1998, five major U.S. tobacco
manufacturers settled a lawsuit with 46 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories.
The plaintiffs in the suit sought compensation for Medicaid costs of treating smoking-related
illnesses. The settlement in that suit, which came to be known as the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA), ordered the tobacco companies to pay $206 billion for 25 years to the
plaintiffs.
Immediately after the settlement, states used the funds to address public health concerns
related to smoking. But as time went on, many states veered away from smoking-related
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expenses and used the funds to plug budgetary holes and pay for various other initiatives (C. L.
Johnson, 2004; Niemeyer et al., 2004). In a comprehensive review of the MSA, Sloan et al.
(2005) analyzed the effects of voter characteristics, political parties, interest groups, prior
spending on public tobacco control programs, and state fiscal health on allocations to tobacco
control, health, and other programs. The researchers found that most of the variables had a
significant impact on the allocation of funds toward (and away from) tobacco-related programs
(Sloan et al., 2005). Ultimately, the funds were expended with no particular regard for or
deference to public health-related expenses and the settlement arrangement became another
revenue source for budget makers in several states.
The works of Johnson (2004), Niemeyer et al. (2004), and Sloan et al. (2005) provided
important insights into the MSA. However, they did not approach the settlement from a windfall
payment perspective. Thus, situated squarely in the traditional budgetary literature, the work of
Sloan et al. (2005) and others ignored perceptions of the windfall and the ways in which public
officials treated the payments. Consequently, a gap in the literature exists. It is possible, for
example, that because the funds were unearned by the states, officials were more likely to spend
the funds for whatever was needed than save them or allocate them strictly toward public health
expenditures. Another possibility is that the funds were considered a gift or bonus that freed up
resources for other budgetary priorities. Either alternative is possible but remains unexplored in
the literature.
Further examination of the MSA is warranted, given the impact the funds had on state
budgets. Currently, it is unclear whether the settlement reinforced political budgetary regimes or
presented an opportunity for state officials to suspend or move away from traditional budgetary
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influences (e.g., political actors and economic circumstances). Understanding if such a departure
occurred could provide insights to scholars and practitioners alike.
Volkswagen Settlement. In 2015, researchers at West Virginia University discovered software
installed in Volkswagen vehicles that allowed diesel engines to cheat emissions tests in the
United States and abroad. An investigation revealed that the company not only knew about the
software but also actively developed and installed it with the intent of circumventing clean air
laws. After the investigation, several Volkswagen executives were charged and imprisoned for
the fraud. Additionally, several civil lawsuits were filed against the company. One of the
lawsuits in the United States was settled, and the funds from the settlement were used to
establish an Environmental Mitigation Trust (EMT). The EMT contained $2.9 billion to be
distributed to the states to reduce transportation emissions (Aragon & Casale, 2017).
While the EMT stipulates how the funds should be spent, no comprehensive account of
the funds exists. Furthermore, little scholarly work has been completed to examine how the
monies have been spent or how any expenditures have been justified (Aragon & Casale, 2017;
Jung & Sharon, 2019). Given this gap, future studies should identify any trends in budgetary
allocations. More specifically, studies should examine whether the windfall payments were
treated as other revenue streams or if other processes took hold, given the payment’s nature as an
exogenous positive shock.
Examining the Volkswagen settlement as a windfall for states named in the suit presents
an opportunity to better understand budgetary windfalls and how public officials perceive them.
Additional work must be completed to determine whether additional guidelines are needed to
ensure that the funds are expended in a consistent way with the EMT. Without additional work,
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the use of the funds could mirror those of the MSA, whereby the intents of the payment were lost
over time.
COVID-19 and Local Government Relief. The United States government delivered $350 billion
to state, local, and Tribal governments to support them during the COVID-19 pandemic. Under
the law, local governments could use the funds to replace lost public sector revenue, respond to
the adversities associated with the pandemic, provide hazard pay for essential workers, and
invest in water, sewer, and broadband infrastructure (Clemens & Veuger, 2020). While these
guidelines presented some structure to the statute, a great deal of ambiguity remained.
Consequently, the treatment of the funds remains unclear in the literature.
Multiple case studies examining how local governments expended the COVID-19 relief
funds exist. Krueger et al. (2021) found that the City of Dallas, Texas, relied heavily on the funds
to stabilize departmental budgets within the municipality. Despite instituting hiring freezes and
furloughs, the City faced dire financial consequences without the funds (Krueger et al., 2021).
Similarly, Singla et al. (2021) conducted a study of Phoenix, Arizona, and observed that a slight
rule change in the statute opened usage of the funds and allowed the City to balance its budget.
Specifically, federal guidelines changed and allowed previously budgeted payroll allocations to
be supplemented by relief payments (Singla et al., 2021). Without that rule change, Phoenix
faced a nearly $100 million shortfall. The relief funds proved instrumental in balancing the
cities’ budgets in both cases. Furthermore, both cities treated the payments as any other revenue
stream and behaved in a manner consistent with the traditional budgeting literature (Levine et al.,
1981).
Despite the extensive review of the cities’ usage of the relief funds, questions remain
regarding the windfall payment. One such question pertains to the rule change. Would officials
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have used the funds to fill the budget hole had the change not occurred? And if so, how would
that have impacted other expenditures? These questions align with the windfall payment
literature and exemplify why a better understanding of these nuanced responses proves
necessary.
The MSA, Volkswagen settlement, and COVID-19 relief payments show the importance
of windfall payments for state and local governments. Had the funds not been distributed, the
financial trajectories of the cities and states in all three examples would have been altered.
Furthermore, in all three cases, guidelines for the funds were ambiguously interpreted or ignored
by the recipients. Considering this ambiguity, understanding how the payments were spent and
why officials allocated them is critical for understanding public finance and public policy.
The Politics of Public Budgeting
Scholars of public budgeting argue that the expenditures made using the MSA,
Volkswagen settlement, and COVID-19 emergency funds are illustrative of the politics that
permeate the public budgeting process. In each case, budgetary actors use their influence within
a set environment to determine how the funds could and should be spent (Caiden, 1985; David
D. Laitin & Aaron Wildavsky, 1988; Levine et al., 1981; Naomi Caiden, 2010). Thus, to
examine how windfall payments are expended, one must understand the actors involved and
factors at play throughout the public budgeting process.
This stance is supported by a vast body of literature on public budgeting within the arenas
of public policy and public administration. That body argues that public budgeting is an
inherently political process in which competing interests seek funds (Rubin, 1993, 2019).
Generally, the literature addresses the actors and circumstances that affect that budgetary process
(Kelly & Wanna, 2000; Stone, 2015; Wildavsky, 1988). In terms of actors, Levine et al. (1981)
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identify citizens (or voters), elected officials, and interest groups/lobbyists as the most influential
parties in the budget-making process. Depending on the level of engagement of each of these
actors, policy outcomes and budgetary decisions vary. Deliberations in public organizations
often reflect the competing interests of each of these actors and their desire for scarce resources.
Equally important as the actors in the decision-making process is the context in which
decisions are made. In the literature concerning public budgets, fiscal stress and social/political
discontent are critical in defining the context in which budgets are determined (Pilaar, 2018). The
health of the overall economy, contractions in the local market, and declining support from upper
levels of government all impact public budgets in the United States (Nguyen-Hoang & Hou,
2014; Snoddon, 2004). Combined, the wishes of various actors and the context in which
budgeting occurs have a tremendous impact on the allocation of funds in public organizations
(Levine et al., 1981).
Given its preoccupation with budgetary actors and contexts, the public budgeting
literature primarily treats windfalls as another revenue stream (Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998;
Paler, 2013). As such, traditional public budgeting contends that regardless of the source of
revenue, the actors involved in budgetary decision-making and the context in which the
budgeting occurs prove most important in understanding how the revenue is spent (John B.
Gilmour & David E. Lewis, 2006; Kelly & Wanna, 2000; Schick, 1994; Wildavsky, 1988). Save
for rules and regulations dictating how money can be allocated (as with block grants and other
intergovernmental transfers), decision-makers are generally revenue agnostic when allocating
funds (Shadbegian, 1999; Stine, 1994). In other words, research in this stream considers funds to
be completely fungible in the eyes of public officials.
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The revenue agnosticism of budget-makers and the fungibility of funds have been
explored in several studies, especially at the state and local levels (Blom-Hansen et al., 2014;
Yan, 2011). Numerous studies within the politics of budgeting literature, for example, found that
governments often value a revenue’s source less than the amount of revenue raised when
allocating funds, especially when facing a budgetary shortfall (Levine et al., 1981; Stine, 1994).
Many communities balance budgets by introducing new or unusual taxes, fees, and fines despite
the sources having negative impacts on their communities (Graham & Makowsky, 2021). Thus,
according to the public budgeting literature, windfalls, while advantageous, elicit no more
thought or care than any other fund in the public purse.
With the idea of revenue agnosticism in mind, all windfall payments made to a state or
local government, according to the scholars within the traditional public budgeting stream, would
be treated like any other revenue source. Political actors would compete to direct the funds
toward their desired programs or initiatives while operating within the confines of vocal citizens,
elected officials, and overarching economic conditions. Few other variables (if any) prove salient
in determining how the funds would be treated and ultimately expended by public officials.
Windfalls, Consumption, and Savings
Outside of the public budgeting literature is a body of work explicitly examining windfall
payments. Much of that work began in the 1950s and 1960s by scholars examining the
consumption of post-war payments made by governments to soldiers of World War II.
Researchers wanted to know whether the soldiers who received the payments spent them the
same or different from their earned income. In those studies, the researchers found varying
consumption levels, with some scholars finding the marginal propensity to consume at or below
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30 percent while others found them to be as high as 72 percent (Bodkin, 1959; Friedman, 1957;
Reid, 1962).
The work of those scholars first began with Milton Friedman. Friedman’s landmark
work, Theory of the Consumption Function examined windfall payments and advanced the
theory of the Permanent Income Hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). The Permanent Income
Hypothesis stipulates that income can be considered permanent or transitory. Permanent income
includes regular payments and savings, while transitory income includes random or accidental
payments—like those given for life insurance claims, gambling winnings, and inheritances.
Friedman argued that permanent income and permanent consumption are correlated and constant
over time. Unlike permanent income, however, transitory income and consumption are
uncorrelated. As a corollary, Friedman (1957) noted that transitory income does not give rise to
consumption. Using this theory, Friedman posited that individuals are much more likely to
consume based on their permanent income rather than their transitory income—a notion that has
been supported by various scholars over the years (Joseph P. DeJuan & John J. Seater, 2006;
Kreinin, 1961).
Despite the central tenets of the permanent income hypothesis, Friedman conceded that
at least some consumption of a windfall occurs. Friedman determined that the marginal
propensity to consume the payment would be about .3. Therefore, it was reasonable to assume
that about 30 percent of a windfall would be consumed by a recipient (Friedman, 1957, 1958).
Otherwise, consumption tracks much more closely with permanent income. Building off the
work of Friedman, Bodkin (1959) also examined post-war payments to evaluate windfall
payment consumption. In his work, he rejected Friedman’s findings. According to Bodkin, the
marginal propensity to consume a windfall was much higher—between .72 and .97. Unlike
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Friedman, Bodkin (1959) argued that windfall payments were highly correlated with spending,
and individuals who received windfalls were much more likely to spend a large majority of the
funds (Bodkin, 1959).
Reid (1962) examined the results of Friedman and Bodkin and sought to reconcile the
findings. In her study, she found that the post-war payments stimulated the purchase of dwellings
and other durable goods. However, the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income
was less than the marginal propensity to consume out of disposal income. Such findings were
more consistent with Friedman’s hypothesis and rejected the level of consumption observed by
Bodkin (1959) (Reid, 1962).
Additional works attempted to determine the points at which the marginal propensity to
consume increases and decreases. Using data from 598 households in Boulder, Colorado, that
received various types of windfall income, Doenges (1966) found that larger payments tended to
be saved and smaller ones spent. Similarly, Abdel-Ghany (1983) found that the marginal
propensity to consume regular income was greater than the marginal propensity to consume
windfall income for windfalls that were large relative to regular income. Using data from the
1972 consumer expenditure survey, Keeler et al. (1985) also found that the marginal propensity
to consume a windfall decreased as the relative size of the payment increased. In each of these
studies, the researchers showed that some level of consumption of windfall payments tended to
occur and that the size of the windfall impacted consumption (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983;
Doenges, 1966; James P. Keeler et al., 1985).
Scholars have recently found mixed effects for the marginal propensity to consume.
Japelli & Pistaferri (2014) examined the marginal propensity to consume using the Survey
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted in 2010 by Banca di Italia. In that survey, the
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researchers found that respondents consumed about 48 percent of windfall gains (Tullio Jappelli
& Luigi Pistaferri, 2014). Similarly, Drescher et al. (2020) found a high level of consumption in
survey data from across Europe. Using data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and
Consumption Survey (HFCS), the researchers found that households, on average, spent between
33% (the Netherlands) and 57% (Lithuania) of such a windfall payment. Although, a wide range
of consumption was observed from country to country (Drescher et al., 2020).
Studies show that at least some portion of windfall payments are consumed and that
consumption is not purely a function of permanent income. However, just how much is
consumed ranges and is contingent on several factors, including windfall size relative to overall
income. Understanding the relationship between windfall payments and consumption is
important because, as Bodkin pointed out, fiscal policies like tax cuts and stimulus payments rely
on consumption to be effective (Bodkin, 1959). Therefore, researchers and practitioners must
understand how windfall payments are treated to understand if the payments will achieve their
intended goals.
Insights from Behavioral Economics
While not directly tied to the early work on windfall payments, new research from
behavioral economics offers several valuable insights to explain why consumption of windfalls
occurs, and the marginal propensity to consume varies. This section will briefly describe the
behavioral economics concepts of fungibility, mental accounting, labeling, emotional
attachments, and timing/anticipation, as well as how they can be helpful in understanding
windfall payment decision-making better. The section will also show how the work of the
behavioral economists can inform the work of this study and others.
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Fungibility Consumer choice theory posits that all money is fungible. In other words, any unit of
money is substitutable for another. Under this theory, earned income, for example, has the same
value as gifts, winnings, and inheritances. Despite its prominence in the literature, however,
fungibility is not guaranteed. A multitude of studies shows that the assumption of fungibility is
regularly violated by decision-makers. In reality, individuals spend funds more or less freely
based on their perceptions of the monies (Abeler & Marklein, 2017; Thaler, 1999; Yuntong Gou
et al., 2013).
Researchers stress that the assumption of fungibility is violated because of cognitive and
emotional influences involved throughout the decision-making process. In short, decisionmakers adopt non-fungible tendencies because of their perceptions, experiences, and emotions.
Violations of the fungibility assumption are copious in the literature. Numerous studies show that
individuals treat some monies differently and refuse to view all funds as substitutable, even when
they logically should be (Abeler & Marklein, 2017; Hines & Thaler, 1995; Thaler, 2008).
The non-fungibility of certain income or revenue helps to explain the consumption of
windfalls. If decision-makers perceive windfalls differently than other income or revenue
streams, then they are less likely to substitute the funds and use windfalls in the same way. For
private decision-makers, this could mean that a check received on a birthday, for example, might
be spent very differently than a check received on a payday because of the emotions attached to
the special event. Similarly, public officials may spend funds from a windfall distributed by the
federal government, which may conjure more positive feelings, differently than the revenue
raised through local taxes, which may conjure more negative feelings. In the latter case, the
emotional and cognitive influences of the decision-makers could be more explanatory of windfall
consumption patterns than more traditional factors, like interest groups and lobbyists.
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Mental Accounting Closely related to fungibility is the concept of mental accounting. Mental
accounting is defined as the cognitive tools and processes used by individuals to organize,
appraise, and manage finances (Hossain, 2018; Pressman, 2006; Thaler, 1999). In essence,
mental accounting is a system of rules and short-cuts individuals use to make economic
decisions. Structures built into mental accounting systems frequently defy rationality as they are
emotionally driven and cognitively flawed. Consequently, mental accounting methods may lead
to illogical or suboptimal decisions for decision-makers.
Scholars of mental accounting support their work mainly through experiments and
controlled studies. Hossain (2018) provides a comprehensive review of these studies and
concludes that the growing body of work provides reasonable support for the existence and
pervasiveness of mental accounting methods. Furthermore, he notes that many studies focused
on mental accounting have tremendous implications for economics and public policy (Hossain,
2018).
Mental accounting methods may be just as prevalent in public officials as in private
individuals. While public officials generally operate within the confines of public budgeting
standards, alternate processes, as described by mental accounting may also be employed.
Therefore, personal mental and emotional cues may significantly impact how budget-makers
allocate funds and offer an alternative view of public budgeting that has not yet been fully
explored.
Labeling Within the mental accounting systems adopted by decision-makers lie mental
accounting labels. Labels refer to the identifiers individuals assign to various monies or funds for
organizational purposes. Just as individuals may separate funds physically, they may also
separate them psychologically. Thus, individuals are inclined to mentally separate vacation
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budgets from rent, groceries, gasoline, etc. By labeling funds mentally, decision-makers create a
schema for expenditures that can be recalled and applied to different situations and contexts
(Abeler & Marklein, 2017; Clark, 2002; Hossain, 2018; Thaler, 1999).
Studies suggest that when a labeling schema is created, individuals change their
consumption according to the labels. Like the broader mental accounting research, numerous
studies employ lab and field experiments to test the pervasiveness of labeling in mental
accounting processes. Overwhelmingly, the research shows that labels impact how and why
individuals allocate funds in certain ways (Abeler & Marklein, 2017; Arkes et al., 1994;
Milkman & Beshears, 2009; Thaler, 2008). Perhaps one of the most important labeling methods
observed is that of earned and unearned funds. Research suggests that the marginal propensity to
consume unearned income is about three times larger than earned income (Christiaensen & Pan,
2010). As such, the labeling schema, and by proxy, values, and emotions associated with them,
significantly impact how funds are spent.
In the case of windfalls, the labels attached to the payments may greatly influence how
much of the funds are saved or spent. Public officials may label the funds as gifts or bonuses that
can free up resources from tax revenues or be used for purchases that may not be included in the
typical operating budget. Research suggests that grant monies often receive special treatment by
public officials and may be related to labeling schemas (Mehiriz & Marceau, 2014; Stotsky,
1991). Depending on the labels attached to funds in the public purse, either formally or
informally, budget-makers may be influenced in their consumption of the monies.
Emotional attachments Many of the labels created for and methods used in mental accounting
processes have emotional significance. Joy, sadness, and even excitement tend to be intertwined
with specific funds. The emotional attachments associated with each label in the mental
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accounting system influence financial decision-making and leads decision-makers toward and
away from outcomes.
Levav and McGraw (2009) found, for example, that when monetary resources possess
negative feelings, people tend to avoid spending them on fun activities. Similarly, decisionmakers tend to spend cash bonuses and gifts on non-essential items and treats (Milkman &
Beshears, 2009). In both studies, the emotions that each labeled account conjures up significantly
influence the decision-making process.
In a public setting, officials are likely to develop emotional attachments to funds. Tax
revenue may be viewed neutrally or even negatively, while grants may be viewed positively. One
such explanation could be that taxes are imposed upon citizens while grants are won by citizens.
Given the distinction, budget-makers may respond by treating the funds very differently
(Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998).
Timing and Anticipation Windfall gains are spent more readily than other assets, especially
when they are a surprise. Research suggests that the timing of windfall payments (e.g., seasons,
landmark events, etc.), as well as anticipation of windfalls, have a significant impact on
consumption patterns (Arkes et al., 1994). This occurs because temporality and anticipation
influence labeling schemas within the mental accounting system. The labels generated and the
emotions that are attached to them in turn change consumption patterns.
Observed non-fungibility, labels, mental accounts, emotional attachments, and the
timing/anticipation of funds may help to explain why windfalls are consumed in varying
proportions. If, for instance, some funds are valued less because they were gifted or granted,
rather than earned, or occurred at a particular time, then consumption of those funds could be
high relative to earned income. Given these observations, research from behavioral economics
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could shed light on windfall payment decision-making and elucidate observed patterns in
windfall consumption.
Applying Behavioral Economics to Public Finance
Despite the intense focus on the politics of budgeting in the literature, some researchers
have identified and documented unique spending patterns for payments received by state and
local governments from outside their borders. More specifically, they have documented a greater
propensity to spend funds received from outside of the community than funds raised from within.
Researchers refer to this phenomenon as the flypaper effect (Becker et al., 2020; Hines & Thaler,
1995; Sylvain Leduc & Daniel Wilson, 2017). According to the literature, payments from outside
of a jurisdiction, in most cases a windfall from the federal government, are often spent at a rate
much greater than taxes raised within the community receiving the payment. Such findings
suggest, then, that some of the observations from behavioral economics, like non-fungibility, are
particularly relevant in the public arena. Moreover, the findings intimate how and where funds
are acquired matters, at least some, to public officials responsible for allocating them. However,
robust studies with large datasets from which patterns can be extrapolated are scarce (Mehiriz &
Marceau, 2014).
Given the lack of information on or attention to windfalls in the literature and the scant
evidence regarding the flypaper effect, a turn to behavioral economics could prove helpful. The
concepts discussed in the previous section, when applied to the public arena, would suggest that
budget-makers may be much less revenue-agnostic than described by scholars in public
budgeting, specifically, and public administration more broadly. Experiments conducted by
behavioral economists contend that individuals may be very sensitive to funding sources, and
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those sensitivities can influence how they allocate those funds. Therefore, it may be possible that
public funds may be spent differently based on how the funds were received.
Act 13 and Applications for Windfall Payment Decision-Making
The Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee was established in 2012 to offset the
local costs of unconventional natural gas development in the Commonwealth. Under the law, the
Public Utility Commission (PUC) assesses a yearly fee on every unconventional natural gas well
in Pennsylvania. The PUC collects the funds and distributes them to the municipalities. Because
the formula used to assess the fee is complex and takes many variables into account, the payment
size to each municipality is often unknown.
Given the structure of the law and the distribution of the payments, the Act 13
Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee offered an opportunity to examine windfall payments to
local governments over time. By comparing the impact fee payments disbursed by the PUC to
municipalities throughout Pennsylvania, the researcher examined the relationship between
payment size and savings rates. However, a brief overview of Act 13 is warranted before delving
into the study.
Current Literature on Act 13 The literature on Act 13 in Pennsylvania is limited. Given the
relevance of the legislation to one state, however, the dearth of work is unsurprising. Research
that does examine Act 13 tends to focus on three areas. One stream examines the legislation in
the context of policy responses to unconventional natural gas development in the United States
and comments on legal challenges to the law. Another stream reviews the amounts received by
municipalities and analyzes the spending patterns of local governments receiving the funds. The
third and final stream deals with citizens’ opinions of the fee and its impacts on communities.
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Research on Act 13 as a policy response to unconventional natural gas development
suggests that the legislation is a unique, albeit controversial, approach to regulating the industry.
Studies addressing the design of Act 13 contend that it was written to maximize local benefits of
the industry and minimize tax burdens on unconventional natural gas operators (Rabe & Borick,
2013). Many regard the impact fee as a middle-of-the-road approach used to ensure that revenue
from the activity stayed at the local level and that operators were not subjected to a severance tax
like they are in other states (Murtazashvili, 2017).
Other studies focusing on Act 13 as a policy response argue that the legislation is fraught
with logistical issues (e.g., revenue has been left uncollected, disbursements have been slow, and
amounts aren’t known until the payments are made to municipalities). Because of its flaws, many
policy experts advocated for abolishing and replacing the fee with a severance tax (Newell &
Raimi, 2018; Rabe & Hampton, 2015; Weijermars, 2015). Scholars also examined the legality of
the impact fee and its controversial clause, which prohibits local governments from interfering in
the siting of wells through planning and zoning laws (Centner & Kostandini, 2015; Gehman et
al., 2012; Jerolmack & Walker, 2018). That clause was challenged and eventually overturned by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (J. A. Smith & Sugarman, 2014; M. F. Smith & Ferguson,
2013). Taken as a whole, the literature focused on the structure and legality of the policy
provided several important details about the law but failed to elucidate how local public officials
view the unconventional natural gas impact fee.
Studies on citizen opinions of Act 13 reveal that the public generally has a positive view
of the fee and supports projects funded by the payments made to municipalities (Paydar et al.,
2016). Furthermore, citizens see the impact fee as a necessary mechanism to ensure that
unconventional natural gas development revenue stays in Pennsylvania and, more specifically,
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local communities (Sica & Huber, 2017). Preference for the locally-focused payments among
citizens might explain why other tax structures, like the severance tax, which is popular in other
states, have not been adopted (Black et al., 2018; Weber et al., 2016). This research clarifies the
impacts Act 13 has on communities, and more specifically, citizens, but does not reveal trends
amongst local public officials.
The literature suggests that Act 13, while controversial in policy spheres, is quite popular
among citizens of Pennsylvania. Throughout the Commonwealth, communities have benefited
from the payment and used the funds to invest in important projects or saved the monies in
reserve funds. The literature does not address the opinions of municipal officials, however.
Views of the impact fee’s structure and deliberations around allocations remain to be seen.
Furthermore, little work has been done to understand how municipalities deal with the high
variability of the fee and if that variability impacts budgetary planning.
Understanding Act 13 Payments Research conducted on payments from Act 13 and spending
patterns of the funds revealed that the amounts collected are highly variable and that
municipalities use the funds in various ways. According to the Pennsylvania Independent Fiscal
Office, the complex formula used to calculate the fee is conducive to large swings in the
payments received by municipalities. In some cases, payment amounts have increased or
decreased by as much as 40 percent in a single year. Records show that the payments received
have been invested in public infrastructure, emergency preparedness and public safety,
stormwater and sewer systems, and environmental programs. Interestingly, counties and
municipalities have saved approximately 39 percent of all funds and placed them in capital
reserve funds for later use. Work in this arena highlights how variable the payment is and how
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the monies are spent but does not address the perceptions of the public officials who receive and
allocate the funds or if those perceptions influence consumption (Bushman, 2020).
Summary
State and local governments may encounter found money. Such payments may come
about because of lawsuits and settlements, like the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement or the
Volkswagen Clean Air Act Civil Settlement. Typically, the amount or frequency of such
payments is unknown or imprecise, which leads policymakers to perceive such payments as
budgetary windfalls.
Perceiving these payments as budgetary windfalls may influence how policymakers treat
them. In other words, policymakers may be inclined to spend or save these funds in a manner
that is different from regular tax revenue. Research at the individual level on windfall payments
suggests that individuals are generally more likely to spend windfalls that are small in proportion
to income and save those that are large (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983; James P. Keeler et al., 1985;
Rucker, 1984; Tullio Jappelli & Luigi Pistaferri, 2014). Under a mental accounting model,
individuals tend to place small, one-time windfall gains in a “mad money” account to spend
frivolously while saving much larger windfall payments (Clark, 2002).
It is unclear if similar trends can be observed in the public setting. In short, does the
literature on windfall payments to individuals help explain how states and municipalities behave
in these unique circumstances? Or does the standard budgeting literature hold? This study used
Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee data to examine how municipalities consumed
the payments. Specific attention was given to how the size of the windfall impacted decisionmakers.
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As windfall payments continue to impact state and local governments, understanding how
policymakers treat them and allocate their funds will prove critical. This research helps to
explain how those funds are perceived and what impact that perception has on allocations. Thus,
this research can address public finance and budgetary problems in both theoretical and applied
terms.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Research on the propensity of collective decision-making bodies to spend or save
windfall payments based on their size relative to overall budgets is scarce. This study examined
the relationship between windfall size and consumption patterns within Pennsylvania
municipalities that received the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee payments. More
specifically, the research sought to determine if municipalities in Pennsylvania were more likely
to spend small windfall payments and save large windfall payments received through Act 13.
Using data made available by the PUC and DCED from 2011 to 2019, the study employed a
panel fixed-effect regression model and, later, a quadratic regression model to examine the
relationship. Several control variables were introduced into the equation to take the population
and prevailing economic conditions into account.
Statement of the Problem
Research from behavioral economics reinforces the importance of windfall size on
consumption, with multiple studies suggesting that perceptions of windfalls, including payment
size, are likely to influence consumption patterns (Arkes et al., 1994; Buddelmeyer & Peyton,
2014; Milkman & Beshears, 2009). The importance of windfalls and windfall size emerged and
developed in the research of Friedman (1957), Bodkin (1959), Doenges (1966), Landsberger
(1966), Abdel-Ghany et al. (1983), Rucker (1984), and Keeler et al. (1985). In the latter works,
Rucker (1984) found that windfall size was a significant predictor of consumption patterns, while
Abdel-Ghany et al. (1983) and Keeler et al. (1985) found that small windfalls received by
individuals tend to be spent and large windfalls (typically valued at 50 percent of permanent
income or greater) tend to be saved. Such findings directly contradicted earlier works concerning
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windfalls and the permanent income hypothesis (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983; James P. Keeler et
al., 1985.
While previous research provides evidence for how individuals treat windfall payments,
it does not generally examine whether collective decision-making bodies, like local or state
governments, treat them differently. Despite this work, few studies on windfall payments explore
whether such patterns apply in group settings. This study sought to determine if similar patterns
applied in the public arena by examining payments from the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas
Impact Fee in Pennsylvania to municipalities.
Research Question and Hypotheses
The purpose of this quantitative research study was to examine the relationship between
windfall payment size and savings in the public arena. The predictor variable was windfall
payment size received by municipalities, and the criterion variable was savings by the
municipalities. At the measurement levels, both variables were ratio measurements. This
approach assisted in answering the following research question and hypotheses:
RQ: To what extent does the relative size of a windfall payment impact savings rates?
H0: The relative size of the Act 13 payment will have no impact on savings rates.
H1: The relative size of the Act 13 payment will have a statistically significant impact on
savings rates.
H2: Municipalities that receive relatively small payments will be more likely to spend
the windfall than municipalities that receive relatively large payments.
Act 13 as an Analysis Study
The Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee was established in 2012 to offset the
local costs of unconventional natural gas development in Pennsylvania. Under the law, the PUC
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assesses a fee each year on every unconventional natural gas well in the Commonwealth. The
PUC collects the funds and distributes them to the municipalities. Not every municipality
receives impact fee dollars; only those that host unconventional natural gas development or are
adjacent to communities that host development receive the funds. There is a lag between the
assessment year and disbursement to the municipalities. In other words, funds collected in 2011
are distributed in 2012, and so on.
Because the formula used to assess the fee is complex and takes many variables,
including the number of wells in each locale, the age of the wells, and changes in the consumer
price index into account, the payment size is often unknown by local officials. While local
officials may have an idea about the amount they will receive based on the intensity of
unconventional natural gas development in their communities, they generally do not have an
exact figure available until after the funds have been collected by the PUC (Black et al., 2018;
Bushman, 2020). Thus, the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee offers an opportunity
to examine windfall payments that are, to an extent, unanticipated to local governments over
time.
Under the law, every municipality (borough, township, and county) that receives
payments from Act 13 must report their allocations to the Commonwealth. Those allocations are
submitted to the PUC on a worksheet with 13 allocation categories. The categories are shown in
Table 1 below. Completed allocation worksheets are returned to the PUC and reported online.
Currently, data for the years 2011 through 2019 are available.
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Table 1: Act 13 Permitted Uses

Act 13 Permitted Uses
1. Construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of roadways,
bridges and public infrastructure.
2. Water, storm water and sewer systems, including construction,
reconstruction, maintenance, and repair
3. Emergency preparedness and public safety, including law
enforcement and fire services, hazardous material response, 911,
equipment acquisition and other services
4. Environmental programs, including trails, parks and recreation,
open space, flood plain management, conservation districts and
agricultural preservation
5. Preservation and reclamation of surface and subsurface waters and
water supplies
6. Tax reductions, including homestead exclusions
7. Projects to increase the availability of safe and affordable housing
to residents
8. Records management, geographic information systems and
information technology
9. The delivery of social services
10. Judicial services
11. Deposit into the municipality’s capital reserve fund if the funds are
used solely for a purpose set forth in Act 13 of 2012
12. Career and technical centers for training of workers in the oil and
gas industry
13. Local or regional planning initiatives under the act of July 31,
1968 (P.L. 805, No. 247), known as the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code

Of the 13 allocation categories, only one represents savings—number eleven. This
category allows municipalities to save the funds in capital reserves for later use by public
officials. The other 12 categories are direct expenditures by the municipality. For this study,
savings are calculated using the monies allocated to the capital reserve fund.
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Panel Estimation
The panel data from 2011 to 2019 were used to estimate the effects of windfall size on
consumption patterns. Consumption was defined as allocations to any category other than capital
reserve deposits. The inverse of consumption was savings, as represented by category number
11, or deposits into capital reserves. The following model was used in the estimation, with
variables shown in municipality m of county c at time t:

Equation 1

𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡

The dependent variable in the model was the percentage of the Act 13 disbursement
(windfall payment) allocated to savings. The independent variable of interest, 𝛽1was the size of
the disbursement relative to the municipal budget. The fixed effects allowed for the control of
endogenous and exogenous factors that may also influence employment and income at the
municipal level over time. To estimate the model in equation (1), the study used unweighted
ordinary least squares regression. Similar approaches have been adopted in the public finance
and windfall payment literature (Paredes et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2016).
The control variables included county-level unemployment, county-level per capita
personal income, municipal population, and net revenues over expenditures reported by the
municipalities. These variables controlled for possible confounding variables (e.g., fiscal
retrenchment) that could be attributed to prevailing economic conditions in each municipality
when windfall payment decision-making occurred (Levine et al., 1981; Stine, 1994).
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Data
This study used secondary municipal- and county-level data to estimate the effects of
windfall size on consumption patterns and did not require institutional review as no human
subjects were involved. The data were made available by the PUC, DCED, BEA, and BLS. The
independent variable, SavingsRate, was calculated by dividing the capital reserve fund allocation
for the reporting year by the total disbursement received by the municipality. The variable
captures how much of the windfall payment received by the municipality was saved rather than
spent. The data for allocations were made available by the PUC.
The independent variable, WindfallSize, was calculated using the payment earned from
Act 13 in the appropriate reporting year divided by the total annual revenue reported in the
municipal budget. Total operating budgets are made available by DCED annually. Such a
calculation aligns with the work of Keeler et al. (1985). In that study, researchers calculated
windfall size relative to the income of individuals. Since governmental entities don’t receive
income, per se, the operating budgets served as the public agency equivalent.
Numerous control variables were incorporated into the model to account for possible
differences associated with endogenous and exogenous factors. The control variable,
Unemployment, was a rate made available by the Local Area Unemployment Statistics of the
BLS. The BLS collects estimates of total unemployment at the county level using a definition of
employment that includes temporary positions as well as those who are self-employed (Agénor,
2010; Elburz et al., 2017). Inclusion of the Local Area Unemployment Statistics was necessary
to account for possible pressures placed on budget-makers during high and low unemployment.
The second control variable, Income, used data made available by the BEA Local Area
Personal Income database. The database includes Per Capital Personal Income (PCPI) as well as
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total full-time and part-time employment by industry. Both measurements are generally accepted
in the literature for examining the impacts of policies or programs on employment and income;
however, PCPI was chosen for this study to capture regional wage differences (Gittings &
Roach, 2019; Paredes et al., 2015). Annual changes to PCPI could impact how decision-makers
allocate the windfall payments within the municipality.
The control variable, Population, referred to the annual total population of each
municipality. The population data were provided by DCED for each municipality on their
respective financial reports. This variable accounted for population size and any inherent
differences between more and less populated municipalities. Controlling for population allowed
the model to parse out any variation between rural, suburban, and urbanized communities.
Finally, the variable FinancialPosition was the net revenues over expenditures reported
by the municipalities on their annual reports to DCED. This variable allowed the researcher to
control for any differences based on the deficit or surplus of the municipality. The inclusion of
the variable addressed some of the common themes apparent in the standard budgeting literature,
which discusses fiscal retrenchment extensively (Levine et al., 1981; Stine, 1994). Table 2 shows
the variable definitions and sources used for the study.
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Table 2: Variable Summary

Variable Name
SavingsRate

Income

Description
The percentage of the
disbursement from the Act 13
payment allocated to the
capital reserve fund
The payment earned from Act
13 in the appropriate
reporting year divided by the
total annual revenue reported
in the municipal budget
Rate of unemployment at the
county level
Per Capita Personal Income

Population

Total population

FinancialPosition

Net revenues over
expenditures

WindfallSize

Unemployment

Source
Spending worksheet
submitted to PUC by
municipalities receiving Act
13 funds
Spending worksheet
submitted to PUC by
municipalities receiving Act
13 funds
Local Area Unemployment
Statistics of the BLS
BEA Local Area Personal
Income database
Annual municipal budget
report submitted to DCED by
all municipalities
Annual municipal budget
report submitted to DCED by
all municipalities

Data Analysis Procedures
The data from all sources, including BEA, BLS, DCED, and PUC were joined based on
municipality name and county location using Microsoft Excel and SPSS. Once the data were
joined, each municipality was constructed as a case for analysis. Wherever needed, variables
were computed within SPSS. For example, the researcher computed the savings rate in the
statistical package by dividing the allocation to capital reserves by the disbursement. All
summary statistics were calculated, and regressions were run using SPSS
Limitations
Limitations outside of the control of the researcher existed for the study. These
limitations included the accuracy of self-reported data and the possibility of missing data. The
first problem, accuracy, may exist because data made available by the PUC and DCED are self-
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reported by the municipalities. Therefore, the accuracy of the data is subject to the skills,
abilities, and desires of the municipalities to present information accurately. Changes to budgets
versus what was reported to the agencies were also probable. While there is no evidence to
suggest directly that the self-reported data is inaccurate, the possibility exists, nonetheless.
Furthermore, there were cases in which data were missing. For some locales in different years,
data was not made available by PUC or DCED. While relatively few, these missing values
inevitably impacted the model.
Summary
This study examined the relationship between windfall size and savings rates by
examining Pennsylvania municipalities that received payments from Act 13. More specifically,
the research sought to determine if municipalities in Pennsylvania were more likely to spend
small windfall payments and save large windfall payments received through Act 13. Using data
made available by PUC and DCED from 2011 to 2018, the study employed a panel fixed-effect
regression model to examine the relationship. Several control variables were introduced into the
equation to take the factors of location, prevailing economic conditions, and population into
account. A primary advantage of the fixed-effects model was that it enabled the researcher to
control for variables that differ across geographies and time (B. Smith, 2015). In this case, the
fixed-effects model was used to examine windfall payments to municipalities over multiple years
while controlling for a host of variables.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between windfall size and
consumption of a windfall in municipalities that received payments from Pennsylvania’s Act 13
Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee between 2011 and 2019. Specifically, the research
sought to determine if municipalities in Pennsylvania were more likely to spend small windfall
payments and save large windfall payments disbursed through the statute. Using data made
available by the PUC and DCED from 2011 to 2019, the study employed a panel fixed-effect
regression model to examine the relationship. The research question and hypotheses were as
follows:
RQ: To what extent does the relative size of a windfall payment impact savings rates?
H0: The relative size of the Act 13 payment will have no impact on savings rates.
H1: The relative size of the Act 13 payment will have a statistically significant impact on
savings rates.
H2: Municipalities that receive relatively small payments will be more likely to spend
the windfall than municipalities that receive relatively large payments.
To test the hypotheses, the researcher examined equation 2, shown below as a linear
regression:

Equation 2

𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡
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Then, the researcher re-estimated the relationship between payment size and spending in
quadratic terms to investigate the significance of any non-linearities in the relationship between
windfall size and savings.
Descriptive Statistics
Before examining the regression results, the researcher reviewed the descriptive statistics
for the 2,455 observations. Outliers (any instance where the windfall size was greater than or
equal to one) were excluded. The mean, standard deviation, and the number of observations for
each variable are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Descriptve Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

SavingRate

81.92

30.73

2455

WindfallSize

10.06

14.32

2455

6.27

1.32

2455

41,438.11

6,063.328

2455

2,404.38

7,075.75

2455

124,762.86

1,073,294.18

2455

Unemployment
Income
Population
FinancialPosition

On average, municipalities saved approximately 82 percent of the windfall payments, a
substantial savings rate compared to the extant literature. However, the standard deviation of
30.73 indicated significant dispersion of the values. The typical payment represented about 10
percent of the municipalities’ annual budgets, though again, the standard deviation of 14.32
showed considerable dispersion.
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Initial Results and Linear Regression
After organizing the data into cases and excluding outliers, the researcher ran a linear
regression in SPSS with the terms shown in equation (1). The results of the regression model are
shown below. The model summary is shown in Table 4, and the coefficients are shown in Table
5. Collinearity statistics are displayed with the coefficients.

Table 4: Model Summary
Model Summary
Change Statistics

Model

R

1

.398a

R Square

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

R Square

Square

the Estimate

Change

.159

.157

28.21297

F Change

.159

df1

92.302

df2
5

Sig. F Change

2449

.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), FinancialPosition, WindfallSize, Unemployment, Income, Population

Table 5: Coefficients and Collinearity Statistics
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)
WindfallSize
Unemployment
Income
Population
FinancialPosition

Std. Error

80.749

8.231

-.855

.041

.982

Coefficients
Beta

Collinearity Statistics
t

Sig.

Tolerance

VIF

9.810

.000

-.398

-20.666

.000

.924

1.082

.579

.042

1.698

.090

.558

1.791

9.312E-5

.000

.018

.731

.465

.544

1.840

.000

.000

-.043

-1.247

.213

.284

3.526

1.654E-6

.000

.058

1.677

.094

.290

3.452

When using only linear terms, the results suggested a statistically significant relationship
between windfall payment size and savings rates (df = 5, F = 92.302, p <.001). The R-square
value (.159) indicated that the model explained 15.9 percent of the variance in the savings rate.
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The regression was run with the predictor variable, WindfallSize, and the control variables
(Unemployment, Income, Population, and FinancialPosition).
In the model, the only statistically significant variable was WindfallSize (p<.001). None
of the control variables proved statistically significant. Examination of the regression coefficient
revealed that the size of the windfall payment received had a statistically significant impact on
the amount saved by the municipality (B = -.398, t = -20.666, p<.001). Based on the beta, the
direction of the impact was negative (B = -.398). The results indicated that as the size of the
windfall increased, the savings rate decreased.
Collinearity diagnostics indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue. The researcher
used guidance from Pallant (2016) to examine the tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF). Pallant (2016) suggests that tolerance values >.10 and their inverse, VIF, of <10 are
acceptable. None of the variables included in the model fell outside of those parameters (Pallant,
2016).
Despite the statistical significance of the model, the researcher decided to conduct a
quadratic regression as a best practice. Quadratic regressions are common in the public finance
and economics literature, as they reflect relationships that are parabolic in nature (Faisal et al.,
2020; Heutel, 2014). Using SPSS, a second regression was run, using the square of WindfallSize.
Quadratic Regression
A quadratic regression was run to determine an alternative model for the data. The
quadratic regression required the researcher to calculate the square of the windfall size for each
municipality. The model summary, ANOVA, coefficients, and curve fit are below.
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Table 6: Quadratic Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
SavingRate
WindfallSize

Std. Deviation

N

81.9342

30.70737

2462

10.0491796

14.32337997

2462

306.0619

745.79652

2462

Windfallsize2

Table 7: Quadratic Model Summary
Model Summary
Std. Error of the
R

R Square
.452

Adjusted R Square

.204

Estimate

.204

27.402

The independent variable is WindfallSize.

Table 8: Quadratic ANOVA
ANOVA
Sum of Squares
Regression

df

Mean Square

F

474243.945

2

237121.973

Residual

1846337.751

2459

750.849

Total

2320581.696

2461

Sig.

315.805

.000

The independent variable is WindfallSize.

Table 9: Quadratic Coeficients
Coefficients
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
WindfallSize
WindfallSize^2
(Constant)

Std. Error

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

-2.020

.104

-.942

-19.355

.000

.024

.002

.587

12.061

.000

94.834

.765

123.933

.000
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Figure 1: Curve Fit

When using quadratic terms, the results suggested that, again, a statistically significant
relationship between windfall payment size and the savings rate existed (df = 2, F = 315.805, p
<.001). The R-square value increased (.204) and indicated that 20.4 percent of the variance in the
savings rate was explained by the model. The regression was run with the predictor variable,
WindfallSize, and none of the control variables since the controls proved statistically
insignificant in the linear model. The quadratic term of WindfallSize was statistically significant
(B = .024, t = 12.061, p<.001).
The curve fit (Figure 1) shows the difference between the linear and quadratic
regressions. While the line of best fit for the linear regression was negative, the quadratic
regression indicated a minimum in the parabola, at which point the savings rate began to
increase. To solve for this minimum, the researcher used the following equation:
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Equation 3

−𝑏 −∆
)
𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥, (ℎ, 𝑘) = (
,
2𝑎 4𝑎
Where ∆= 𝑏 2 − 4𝑎𝑐
Solving the equation yielded coordinates for the minimum (42.083, 48.22). The
coordinates of the minimum suggested that as the windfall size reached 42.08 percent of the
municipal budget, the savings rate reached a minimum of 48.22 percent and then increased.
Rather than the strictly negative relationship observed in the linear regression, the quadratic
regression suggested that the savings rate decreased before increasing.
Answering the Research Question and Addressing the Hypotheses
The study examined the relationship between windfall size and consumption of a windfall
in municipalities that received payments from the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact
Fee in Pennsylvania between 2011 and 2019. In addition, the research also sought to determine if
municipalities in Pennsylvania were more likely to spend small windfall payments and save large
windfall payments received through the statute. Using data made available by PUC and DCED
from 2011 to 2019, the study employed a panel fixed-effect regression model to examine the
relationship.
After running linear and quadratic regressions, the researcher concluded that the size of
the Act 13 payment is a predictor of windfall savings. As for the direction of the relationship
between windfall size and savings, the linear regression showed a negative relationship—as
windfall size increased, savings rates decreased. The results of the quadratic regression, however,
suggested that municipalities saved small windfalls at a decreasing rate until the windfall size
reached about 42 percent of the municipal budget. After that point, municipalities saved the
windfall at an increasing rate.
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The nuances identified by the quadratic regression provided interesting insights for the
study. The parabola shown by the equation suggests that the relationship between windfall size
and savings rate is even more complex than previously thought. Given the minimum of the
parabola, there appears to be a point at which public officials treat the windfalls differently,
which in turn influences savings rates. Such a finding illustrates the complexity of the
relationship and provides direction for future studies.
Summary
This chapter presented the results of two regressions run as a part of an analysis of the
relationship between windfall payment size and savings rates. The first regression was linear and
showed a statistically significant negative relationship between the independent (windfall size)
and dependent (savings rate) variables. The second regression was quadratic and showed a
statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The Rsquare value in the quadratic model was higher than in the linear model, at .204 and .159,
respectively. These results suggest that the relationship between windfall payment size and
savings rates is parabolic, with savings reaching a minimum where the payment size is 42.08
percent of the municipal budget and the savings rate is 48.22 percent of the payment received.
The next chapter will discuss the findings further and provide additional information about the
significance of the study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Research on windfall payments completed before this study indicates that when
individuals receive found or unanticipated funds, they are more inclined to spend small amounts
and save large ones. Scholars suggest this is the case because the small amounts may be
perceived as a type of mad money that is spent more easily than large sums (Arkes et al., 1994;
Milkman & Beshears, 2009; Rucker, 1984). Building off that scholarship, this study sought to
determine if the same patterns could be observed in the public setting. Using disbursement data
from the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee in Pennsylvania, the researcher
examined whether the size of the windfall impacted how much of the payment was saved or
spent by budget-makers.
The study results showed a complex relationship between windfall payment size and
savings rates. Rather than a positive correlation, whereby savings rates increased as windfall size
increased, a parabolic relationship was observed. Municipalities tended to save the funds at a
decreasing rate until reaching a minimum. Located at the coordinates (x= 42.08, y= 48.22), the
minimum suggested that as the windfall size reached 42.08 percent of the municipal budget, the
savings rate reached a low of 48.22 percent and then increased at an increasing rate. These
findings bolster arguments by economists that consumption is not purely a function of permanent
income (Bodkin, 1959; Joseph P. DeJuan & John J. Seater, 2006). Furthermore, the study applied
current research to the public arena, an application that is scarce in the literature.
This chapter will discuss the findings and situate them in the context of the extant
literature. Following that discussion, the researcher will discuss the implications of the results in
the field of public administration. Next, the researcher will discuss the limitations of the study.
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The chapter will close with a brief discussion on future research and new directions for the
public budgeting literature.
Study and Findings
The study examined the relationship between windfall payment size and savings in the
public arena. Using secondary municipal- and county-level data made available by PUC, DCED,
BEA, and BLS, the study estimated the effects of windfall size on savings patterns. The
independent variable, SavingsRate, was calculated by dividing the capital reserve fund allocation
for the reporting year by the total disbursement received by the municipality. The independent
variable, WindfallSize, was calculated using the payment earned from Act 13 in the appropriate
reporting year divided by the total annual revenue reported in the municipal budget.
Numerous control variables were incorporated into the model to account for possible
differences associated with endogenous and exogenous factors. The control variable,
Unemployment, was a rate made available by the Local Area Unemployment Statistics of the
BLS. Inclusion of the Local Area Unemployment Statistics was necessary to account for possible
pressures placed on budget-makers during high and low unemployment.
The second control variable, Income, used data made available by the BEA Local Area
Personal Income database. The database includes Per Capital Personal Income (PCPI) as well as
total full-time and part-time employment by industry. Annual changes to PCPI were expected to
influence how decision-makers allocate the windfall payments within the municipality.
The population data were provided by DCED for each municipality on their financial
reports. The variable Population controlled for the annual total population of each municipality.
This variable accounted for population size and any inherent differences between more and less
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populated municipalities. Controlling for population allowed the model to parse out any variation
between rural, suburban, and urbanized communities (Whitaker et al., 2011).
Finally, the variable FinancialPosition was the net revenues over expenditures reported
by the municipalities on their annual reports to DCED. This variable allowed the researcher to
control for any differences based on the deficit or surplus of the municipality. The inclusion of
the variable addressed some of the common themes apparent in the standard budgeting literature,
which discusses fiscal retrenchment extensively (Levine et al., 1981; Stine, 1994).
After organizing the data into cases and excluding outliers (any instance where the
windfall size was greater than or equal to one), the researcher ran a linear regression in SPSS.
When using only linear terms, the results suggested a statistically significant relationship
between windfall payment size and the savings rate (df = 5, F = 92.302, p <.001). The R-square
value (.159) indicated that 15.9 percent of the variance in the savings rate was explained by the
model. The regression was run with the independent variable, WindfallSize, the dependent
variable, SavingsRate, and the control variables (Unemployment, Income, Population, and
FinancialPosition).
After running the model, the only statistically significant variable was WindfallSize
(p<.001). None of the control variables proved statistically significant. Examination of the
regression coefficient revealed that the size of the windfall payment received had a statistically
significant impact on the amount saved by the municipality (B = -.398, t = -20.666, p<.001). The
direction of the impact was negative (B = -.398). The results indicated that as the size of the
windfall increased, the savings rate decreased.
The researcher examined the data for curvilinear relationships, interaction effects, and
lines of best fit. After analyzing the data, the researcher ran a quadratic regression, given the
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possibility of a curvilinear relationship. When using quadratic terms, the results suggested that a
statistically significant relationship between windfall payment size and the savings rate existed
(df = 2, F = 315.805, p <.001). The R-square value increased (.204) and indicated that 20.4
percent of the variance in the savings rate was explained by the model. The regression was run
with the predictor variable, WindfallSize, and none of the control variables since none of the
controls proved statistically significant in the linear model. The quadratic term of WindfallSize
was statistically significant (B = .024, t = 12.061, p<.001).
After running linear and quadratic regressions, the researcher concluded that the size of
the Act 13 payment was a predictor of windfall savings. Thus, the null hypothesis, that windfall
payment size had no impact on savings rates, was rejected. The second hypothesis of the study,
that payment size and savings rates were positively correlated, was partially rejected and
partially accepted. The result of the quadratic regression suggested that municipalities saved
small windfalls at a decreasing rate until the windfall size reached about 42 percent of the
municipal budget. After that point, municipalities saved the windfall at an increasing rate.
Explanation of Results
The study results show a complex relationship between windfall payment size and
savings rates in Pennsylvania municipalities that received disbursements from the Act 13
Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee. While the linear regression indicated a negative
correlation between windfall size and savings, the quadratic regression indicated a parabolic
correlation. Neither model showed that the control variables, which represented factors identified
in the traditional budgeting literature, were statistically significant. The results suggested that
windfall payment size is predictive of savings rates in Pennsylvania municipalities.
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Linear Regression The observed negative relationship between windfall size and savings rates
was unexpected given the extant literature. Previous research suggested that windfall payment
size and savings rates were positively correlated (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983; James P. Keeler et
al., 1985). The results of this study suggested the opposite. One possible explanation for this
finding is how unconventional natural gas development impacts communities and the costs that
local governments incur during extraction. Because of these costs, spending may be higher in
communities that received large payments as those communities were likely to have the most
unconventional natural gas development. Conversely, communities with relatively small
payments may have saved the funds because they did not have as many costs or externalities
from unconventional natural gas development.
The economic, environmental, governmental, and infrastructural costs associated with the
industry are well-documented in the literature (Clough, 2018; Haikola & Anshelm, 2019;
Ouedraogo, 2016; Paredes et al., 2015; M. F. Smith & Ferguson, 2013; Tsvetkova & Partridge,
2016). Some of the most common complaints at the local government level include damage to
roads and bridges and stress on local services, like police and fire protection. Roads and bridges
often get damaged during the transport of heavy equipment used at the well pads, while strains
on local services appear because of the influx of workers to the area of extraction (Hinton, 2018;
Lim, 2018; Murphy et al., 2018). Because of these costs, jurisdictions with heavy development
may have chosen to spend rather than save the Act 13 funds as they incurred more costs over
time.
In fact, the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee was established for precisely
this reason. Lawmakers intended for the monies to offset the costs associated with
unconventional natural gas development in municipalities across Pennsylvania. Given these costs
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and the intent of the fee in mind, it is possible that the municipalities used the funds to mitigate
the impacts of the industry. This explanation addresses the negative, linear relationship observed.
Quadratic Regression The quadratic regression yields a different result from the linear model.
Rather than a strictly negative correlation between windfall payment size and savings rates, the
quadratic regression showed a positive parabolic relationship between the two variables.
Research from Rucker (1984) helps to explain this relationship. Rucker (1984) argues that while
windfall payment size and consumption are related, there are certain points or sizes at which
consumption changes dramatically. Using her logic, the minimum of the curve in the quadratic
model may represent that point.
According to Rucker (1984), who examined windfall payment decision-making among
university employees who received retroactive pay increases, a windfall must be sufficiently
large for consumption patterns to be impacted. She found that the windfall payment had to reach
$230 before individuals in her study identified a specific use for the funds (Rucker, 1984). At
that point, recipients of the windfall shifted their spending patterns from current expenses and
debts to allocations toward new expenses.
Borrowing from Rucker (1984), the researcher contends that the minimum of the
parabola represents a point where public officials significantly changed their behavior. Such an
argument may explain why many small payments from Act 13 were allocated to savings rather
than immediate expenditures. In many cases, the municipalities may not have found the small
amounts to be worth the trouble of allocating for specific expenditures on the reporting form
provided by PUC. As a result, they tended to save more of the funds, at least initially, in the
capital reserve category provided on the Act 13 allocation reporting. From there, savings
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decreased until hitting the minimum. At the higher payment sizes, public officials resumed
saving the monies as they contemplated how to spend the more significant sums.
The notion of manageability, stewardship, and strategic use of revenue from a windfall
payments appears in the resource extraction literature. Numerous studies on permanent and
legacy funds established from natural resource extraction revenue exist (Andersen & Hjortskov,
2016; Bishop, 2014; Kozminski & Baek, 2017; Rabe & Hampton, 2015). These studies suggest
that jurisdictions with vast reserves of natural gas extraction often view windfalls from the
resource as a strategic way to invest in their communities and prepare for possible downturns in
the future. It is possible that the municipalities felt the same way about the funds when the
disbursements received were sufficiently large.
The findings from Rucker (1984), paired with the resource extraction literature findings,
offer a reasonable explanation for the curvilinear relationship between payment size and savings
rates. Very small windfalls are saved because they are perceived neither as important nor
meaningful increases in revenue. At the opposite end of the spectrum, very large windfalls are
also saved. However, they are saved because they are viewed as important and meaningful
increases in revenue that may require additional thought or planning.
Study Findings and the Current Literature
Unlike the traditional literature on the politics of budgeting, emerging research suggests
that the perception of windfall payments in state and local government settings may influence
how budget-makers treat them (Basili et al., 2008; Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998; Mehiriz &
Marceau, 2014). Public officials may be inclined to spend or save the funds in a manner that is
different from endogenous taxes or fees because the funds present an opportunity to depart from
typical budgeting processes (Heyndels & Van Driessche, 1998). The literature from behavioral
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economics contends that this is so because budgetary decision-makers may be highly influenced
by mental accounting methods when dealing with such payments, and as result, treat the funds as
a bonus or gift (Levav & Mcgraw, 2009; Thaler, 2008). As such, public officials may spend
rather than save windfalls based on a myriad of factors that are absent from the traditional
literature on public finance and budgeting.
One of the factors impacting the consumption of windfalls is windfall size. Numerous
studies spanning several decades suggest that windfall payment size impacts consumption
patterns. Using data from 598 households in Boulder, Colorado, that received various windfall
incomes, Doenges (1966) found that larger payments tended to be saved and smaller ones spent.
Similarly, Abdel-Ghany (1983) found that the marginal propensity to consume regular income
was greater than the marginal propensity to consume windfall income for payments that were
large relative to regular income. In an analysis of retroactive payments made to university
employees, Rucker (1984) found that the size of a windfall was the most critical discriminator
concerning windfall savings. Using data from the 1972 consumer expenditure survey, Keeler et
al. (1985) also found that the marginal propensity to consume a windfall decreased as the relative
size of the payment increased. In each of these studies, the researchers showed that some level of
consumption of windfall payments tended to occur and that the size of the windfall impacted
consumption (Abdel‐Ghany et al., 1983; Doenges, 1966; James P. Keeler et al., 1985).
Most recently, scholars have found mixed effects on windfall payment size. Japelli &
Pistaferri (2014) examined the marginal propensity to consume using the Survey Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted in 2010 by Banca di Italia. In that survey, the researchers
found that respondents consumed about 48 percent of windfall gains (Tullio Jappelli & Luigi
Pistaferri, 2014). Similarly, Drescher et al. (2020) found a high level of consumption in survey
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data from across Europe. Using data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS), the researchers found that households, on average, spent between 33% (the
Netherlands) and 57% (Lithuania) of such a windfall payment. Although, a wide range of
consumption was observed from country to country (Drescher et al., 2020).
This study contributed to the body of work by applying various concepts and theories to
the Act 13 Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee in Pennsylvania. As such, the study
advanced the literature in several ways. First, the study results offered further evidence that
transitory income and consumption are correlated. This finding contradicted Friedman’s (1957)
contention that transitory income does not give rise to consumption and that individuals are
much more likely to consume based on their permanent income rather than their transitory
income. With this additional evidence in mind, the literature should work to identify the nuances
in decision-making processes rather than continue to debate the fundamental relationship
between permanent income, transitory income, and consumption.
Second, the research contended that windfall payment size is a crucial discriminator in
windfall consumption. Like Rucker (1984) and others, the researcher showed that windfall
payment size significantly impacted consumption patterns. Even with the inclusion of multiple
control variables, windfall payment size still proved most valuable in understanding how
windfall recipients spent or saved the funds.
Third, the study showed a curvilinear relationship between windfall size and savings rates
as well as a parabolic minimum, which is largely absent from the literature. While other studies
attempted to determine the point at which windfall recipients shift from spending to saving and
vice versa, few works examined the relationship in quadratic terms. Evaluating the relationship
using a quadratic expression offered an alternative path for future analysis.
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Finally, the study provided a novel application of behavioral economics to the public
sector. At the time of this publication, few works attempted to evaluate behavioral influences in
state and local government finance. This work offered an application to public finance broadly
and windfall payment decision-making specifically. The results suggested that more work should
be done, as the traditional public budgeting literature proved unhelpful in explaining the
consumption of the Act 13 funds.
Implications for Public Administration
As state and local governments continue to receive stimulus payments, cash settlements,
and exogenous fees or rebates, understanding the relationship between windfall payments and
consumption becomes more relevant. Public administrators should understand how budgetmakers treat windfall payments and if the budgeting processes for windfall payments are
different from standard revenue streams. In addition, policymakers and officials granting the
funds should understand how windfall size can alter the intended outcomes or effects of the
payment. This study addressed this critical issue by examining windfall payments received by
local governments and offers some insights for public administrators.
Concerning the recipients of windfalls, the study results indicated that budgeting politics
are not the only factors influencing windfall payment decision-making. Instead, behavioral
influences, like perceptions of the payment, including relative size, may also be at play. The
study showed that windfall size was the most important factor determining how much of the
payments were saved and spent. Thus, entities receiving windfall payments should be cognizant
of personal perceptions and address potential cognitive biases in the decision-making process.
Likewise, policymakers and grantors of exogenous payments should recognize that
windfall size is an essential consumption indicator. Thus, officials who wish to provide monetary
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support to public entities should carefully consider payment size, as it can undermine the intent
of the payment. If the desired outcome of a windfall payment is to stimulate spending, for
example, then payments that are too small or too large could prove detrimental since officials are
more inclined to save them. Conversely, if the intent of the payment is to establish a trust or
legacy fund that will provide support into the future, then the payment should be substantial so
that recipients will evaluate the funds and their uses more carefully.
Study Validity
The researcher considered internal and external validity throughout the research process.
Internal validity refers to the structure of the design, while external validity refers to the
applicability or generalizability of the study overall (G. Johnson, 2014). The researcher
attempted to avoid or mitigate typical threats for both. For this study, external validity issues
were more significant than those for internal validity.
Johnson (2014) identifies several threats to internal validity, including history,
maturation, testing, instrumentation, regression to the mean, selection, sampling, and attrition.
Because the study was quantitative and analyzed disbursements from the Act 13 Unconventional
Natural Gas Impact Fee to municipalities in Pennsylvania, many of these threats were avoided.
The researcher included all municipal recipients for every year of available data since the fee
was established. Consequently, the study was comprehensive in its analysis of Pennsylvania’s
municipalities and avoided issues regarding sampling and populations. Additional internal
validity concerns proved irrelevant given the use of secondary data reported by state and federal
agencies (Druckman et al., 2011).
As for external validity, the primary threat was the study’s focus on one particular state.
While the study was comprehensive in its approach to the population of interest in Pennsylvania,
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the patterns observed may be unique to that state. Therefore, the scope of the study was limited,
and the results may not be generalizable to other populations. However, such an issue is not
uncommon and regularly appears in the public policy and public administration literature (G.
Johnson, 2014).
Limitations and Delimitations
All research has delimitations and limitations. Delimitations are choices or parameters
established by the researcher, while limitations are factors that are outside of the researcher’s
control. A discussion of both is necessary as they impact the applicability and generalizability of
the results. In this study, the researcher identified two major delimitations and limitations.
The study’s exclusive focus on Pennsylvania and its municipalities was the first
delimitation. Indeed, many other states and municipalities receive windfall payments that differ
significantly in size and structure from those disbursed through the Act 13 Unconventional
Natural Gas Impact Fee. Therefore, the findings may be exclusive to Pennsylvania and may not
elucidate trends in other locales. The second delimitation was the researcher’s employment of
quantitative techniques only. No surveys, interviews, or other qualitative methods were included
in the design of the study. The inclusion of qualitative measures could have enriched the study by
providing context or reasoning for local public officials' decisions.
Limitations of this study included the accuracy of self-reported data and the possibility of
missing data. The first problem, accuracy, may exist because data made available by the PUC
and DCED are self-reported by the municipalities. Therefore, the accuracy of the data was
subject to the municipalities' skills, abilities, and desires to present information accurately.
Changes to budgets versus what was reported to the agencies were also probable. While there is
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no evidence to suggest directly that the self-reported data was inaccurate, the possibility exists,
nonetheless.
Furthermore, there were cases in which data were missing. For some locales in specific
years, data was not made available by the PUC or DCED. There were fewer than 50 missing
observations between 2011 and 2019. While relatively small, these missing values inevitably
impacted the model.
The delimitations and limitations addressed are not uncommon in the literature
(Druckman et al., 2011). Inevitably, the researcher must limit the scope of the study and cannot
adopt a completely exhaustive research methodology. Similar studies on windfall payments have
adopted exclusively quantitative methods. Therefore, the parameters of this study were typical
for this stream of research.
Future Research
The findings of this study provide several directions for future research. Some of these
directions pertain to Act 13 specifically, while others more broadly pertain to windfall payments
and behavioral public finance. In both cases, additional or alternative methods may be needed to
expound the trends identified. This section will discuss both the specific and broad directions for
future research.
Act 13 Research In the future, additional work should be completed to understand the views and
opinions of decision-makers who allocate funds from Act 13. A survey instrument could be
beneficial in this endeavor. Survey data may illustrate how budget-makers feel about the funds
and reporting requirements, if the size of the payment proved worthwhile or manageable, and if
feelings of stewardship or strategic management impacted their decision-making. Such findings
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could support or reject some of the conjectures of the researcher pertaining to the curvilinear
relationship between payment size and savings rates in the context of Act 13
Additionally, future work should examine whether the monies disbursed through Act 13
have long-term community impacts. Further analysis could identify, for example, if the funds
adequately address the externalities of development by covering the costs incurred by local
governments. This research could help lawmakers determine whether the statute should be
modified in the future.
Windfall Payment Decision-Making and Behavioral Public Finance In terms of windfall
payments, future research should address how public officials perceive them and if those
perceptions impact their decision-making. Given the body of literature on fungibility, mental
accounting methods, and labels, research should evaluate whether those theories apply to
windfall payments at the state and local government levels. Again, survey research could prove
helpful in this area. Alternatively, interviews or focus groups with public officials could help
elucidate attitudes toward and perceptions of windfall payments.
Apart from windfall payments, more work applying behavioral economics to public
finance is needed. This study highlights the applicability of the field to budgeting and
allocations. But many other applications exist. Current research appears to be heading in this
direction, wither numerous researchers examining behavior in the public arena (Espinosa et al.,
2021). Some of the more pressing questions revolve around the timing and anticipation of funds.
The issue of timing and anticipation could be explored by comparing windfall payments
and their lead times. In the case of legal settlements, for example, news coverage of the court
cases could influence consumption patterns since budget-makers have a more extended period to
debate potential expenditures. The consumption patterns observed in those cases could be
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compared to other windfalls that have very short lead times or are entirely unanticipated. Such
work could show additional utility for insights from behavioral economics.
Summary
The study sought to determine if a relationship between windfall size and consumption of
a windfall existed by examining municipalities that received payments from the Act 13
Unconventional Natural Gas Impact Fee in Pennsylvania between 2011 and 2019. In addition,
the research also sought to determine if municipalities in Pennsylvania were more likely to spend
small windfall payments and save large windfall payments received through the statute. Using
data made available by BEA, BLS, PUC, and DCED from 2011 to 2019, the study employed a
panel fixed-effect regression model and a quadratic regression model to examine the
relationship.
The linear regression model showed a statistically significant negative relationship
between the independent (windfall size) and dependent (savings rate) variables. The quadratic
regression showed a statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent
variables. The R-square value in the quadratic model was higher than in the linear model, at .204
and .159, respectively. These results suggested that the relationship between windfall payment
size and savings rates was parabolic in, with the savings rates reaching a minimum at 48.22
percent when the payment size was 42.08 percent of the municipal budget. In both models,
windfall size was the only statistically significant predictor of savings.
The results suggested that critical breaking points existed along the curve for determining
consumption patterns of the disbursements. Payments must be sufficiently large for expenditures
to take place but not so large that the payments become unmanageable. Such results build off the

65

work of other researchers in the field and indicate the importance of alternative analyses of
windfall payment decision-making.
More work should be done to examine the thoughts, opinions, and motives of decisionmakers who receive windfall payments. Since windfall payment size proved impactful in this
study, other cognitive factors likely influence budgetary decision-making as well. Understanding
these factors will help recipients of windfalls make better choices and grantors of windfalls
become more strategic in their disbursement of monies.
Additionally, greater attention should be given to applying behavioral economics
concepts to public budgeting and administration. While the politics of budgeting literature has
dominated for many years, this study and others show that other factors influence budgetmaking. However, more work needs to be done to determine how and why behavioral factors
influence budget-making in the public arena.
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Appendix
SPSS Syntax
GET
FILE='C:\Users\corey\OneDrive\Desktop\Dissertation Data\Master Working File.sav'.
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2012=Disb_2011/Totrev_2012.
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2013=Disb_2012/Totrev_2013.
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2014=Disb_2013/Totrev_2014.
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2015=Disb_2014/Totrev_2015.
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2016=Disb_2015/Totrev_2016.
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2017=Disb_2016/Totrev_2017.
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2018=Disb_2017/Totrev_2018.
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE Windfall_Lag_2019=Disb_2018/Totrev_2019.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
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COMMENT in this step data was transposed from individual level data to individual-period data.
VARSTOCASES
/MAKE SavingRate FROM Savings2011 Savings2012 Savings2013 Savings2014 Savings2015
Savings2016 Savings2017 Savings2018
/MAKE

WindfallSize

FROM

Windfall_RY2011

Windfall_RY2012

Windfall_RY2013

Windfall_RY2014 Windfall_RY2015 Windfall_RY2016 Windfall_RY2017 Windfall_RY2018
/MAKE Unemployment FROM UR2012 UR2013 UR2014 UR2015 UR2016 UR2017 UR2018
UR2019
/MAKE PCPI FROM INC2012 INC2013 INC2014 INC2015 INC2016 INC2017 INC2018
INC2019
/MAKE

Population

FROM

Population_2012

Population_2013

Population_2014

Population_2015 Population_2016 Population_2017 Population_2018 Population_2019
/MAKE

DefSurp

FROM

Revoverexp_2012

Revoverexp_2013

Revoverexp_2014

Revoverexp_2015 Revoverexp_2016 Revoverexp_2017 Revoverexp_2018 Revoverexp_2019
/INDEX=Index1(9)
/KEEP=Municipalityname County Municipalitytype
/NULL=KEEP.
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(WindfallSize <= 1).
VARIABLE LABELS filter_$ 'WindfallSize <= 1 (FILTER)'.
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.
FORMATS filter_$ (f1.0).
FILTER BY filter_$.
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EXECUTE.
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT SavingRate
/METHOD=ENTER WindfallSize Unemployment PCPI Population DefSurp.
* Curve Estimation.
TSET NEWVAR=NONE.
CURVEFIT
/VARIABLES=SavingRate WITH WindfallSize
/CONSTANT
/MODEL=LINEAR QUADRATIC
/PLOT FIT.
COMPUTE windfallsize2=WindfallSize*WindfallSize.
EXECUTE.
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
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/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT SavingRate
/METHOD=ENTER WindfallSize windfallsize2.
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